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INTRODUCTION

John Horner is a 47-year-old father of three who lost his eye in
an accident and was prescribed medication to help with the pain. 1
He had no prior drug arrests and worked a modest job at a fast food
restaurant. 2 One day at work, he met a man that he instantly
connected with. 3 John could tell the man was in pain; but the man
explained that he did not have enough money for rent and pain
medication, so he asked if he John would sell his pain medication. 4
John agreed and, on several occasions, sold him some prescription
morphine and hydrocodone. 5
During their last exchange, John was arrested and charged
with drug trafficking, a crime that carries a twenty-five year
mandatory sentence. 6 After his arrest, John discovered that his new
“friend” was a confidential informant working with the government
to find drug traffickers in exchange for a reduced prison sentence. 7
When prosecutors offered John a similar deal, he agreed to plead
1. Connor Friedersdorf, A Heartbreaking Drug Sentence of Staggering
Idiocy, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2013/04/a-heartbreaking-drug-sentence-of-staggering-idiocy/274607/.
2. Id. Although Horner was a first-time drug offender, he had a prior
conviction for statutory rape at the age of 18. Id. However, this did not play a
part in the imposition of his mandatory minimum sentence and does not detract
from the unfairness of his sentence. Id.
3. Rob Walker, The Trouble with Using Police Informants in the U.S., BBC
NEWS MAGAZINE (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine21939453?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter.
4. Id. Horner claims that he also loaned the confidential informant (“Matt”)
money. Id. There is still some dispute as to whether the money paid to Horner
by the informant was for the pills or as a repayment for the loan. Id. The
Sheriff’s Office’s records indicate three separate payments totaling $1,800. Id.
5. Morphine, also known as “MS Cotin” or “morphine sulfate,” and
hydrocodone are different types of prescription narcotics prescribed to treat
moderate to sever pain. Morphine, DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/
morphine.html (last visited April 1, 2014); Hydrocodone and Acetaminophen,
DRUGS.COM, http://drugs.com/hydrocodone.html (last visited April 1, 2014).
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) classifies drugs into five
categories, Schedule I (most dangerous) through Schedule V (least dangerous),
based on acceptable use, potential for abuse, and risk of dependency. Drug
Scheduling, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/dea/druginfo/ds.shtml (last
visited April 1, 2014). Morphine and hydrocodone are Schedule III narcotics. Id.
By itself, Hydrocodone is a Schedule II drug, but it is frequently combined with
acetaminophen, a non-narcotic pain reliever, to create Vicodin, which raises its
classification to Schedule III. Id.
6. Friedersdorf, supra note 1. Horner was prosecuted in Central Florida,
where the court applied Florida law. Id. Horner explained that, upon the advice
of his public defender, he decided it was best not to go to trial because the
prosecutors had such a solid case against him. Id.
7. Id. It was later revealed that the confidential informant had an extensive
record of drug trafficking offenses and was facing a fifteen-year mandatory
minimum for drug trafficking at the time. Id. After helping the government
convict more drug offenders, the informant was sentenced to eighteen months
and is now free. Id.
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guilty and become an informant in exchange for a ten-year
sentence. 8 Unfortunately, because John was not able to help
prosecute any new cases, he received the mandatory minimum 9 and
will likely be 72 years old when he is released from prison. 10 John’s
entire prison term will end up costing taxpayers approximately
$475,000. 11
Situations like John’s illustrate the drastic impact mandatory
minimums have on the lives of non-violent drug offenders and
society as a whole. 12 Congress tried to deal with the problem by
passing the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), which aimed to
restore fairness to federal cocaine sentencing. 13 But the FSA has not
remedied the problem. Judges are still restricted by excessive
mandatory minimums and many offenders cannot benefit from the
FSA because it does not apply retroactively. 14 As a result, federal
prisons are filled beyond capacity with nearly half of all inmates
incarcerated for drug-related offenses. 15 Of those, roughly sixty
8. Id. In Horner’s case, he was given two options: (1) plead guilty and receive
a fifteen year sentence or (2) plead guilty, become an informant for the
government, and receive a ten year sentence if he helped build cases against
five other drug traffickers. Id.
9. Id. Criminal informants are used by the government to penetrate crime
by using the low level dealers (often, defendants arrested for trafficking
offenses) to get to individuals higher up in the drug scheme that are harder to
find because they are not the ones actually selling. Id. However, because John
was not involved in a broader drug scheme and had no previous drug arrests,
he was not able to find people to “snitch” on. Id. Thus, John’s case demonstrates
how this practice can result in worse criminals serving lower sentences. Id.
10. A minimum of eighty-five percent of a federal sentence must be served.
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL PRISON
SYSTEM 1 (2004), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/inc_truthinsentencing.pdf.
11. Walker, supra note 3. Even assuming the costs do not fluctuate with
inflation or other factors, the cost of $19,000 per year multiplied by twenty-five
years produces a total cost of $475,000. Oversight of the Dept. of Justice Before
the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 7–10
(2013) (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of
Justice), available at http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113ap19-wstate-horowitzm-20130314.pdf; Annual Determination of Average Cost of
Incarceration,
FEDERAL
REGISTER
(Mar.
18,
2013),
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/03/18/2013-06139/annual-deter
mination-of-average-cost-of-incarceration (summarizing the degree to which
federal prisons deplete the Department of Justice budget and the average cost
to keep a federal inmate in prison for one year).
12. The result appears to contradict many of the sentencing policies and
goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). The employed, non-violent drug offender with
three young children is in jail, while a repeat drug offender is out of jail because
he was more connected in the drug industry and able to help the government
secure more convictions. Walker, supra note 3.
13. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, §
2 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.)
14. Id.
15. Offenses, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (showing
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percent received sentences subject to mandatory minimums. 16
The current sentencing policies must be reformed to achieve
the purposes set forth by the factors under the statutory sentencing
provisions. 17 Senators Dick Durbin and Mike Lee recently
introduced The Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013 (SSA), 18 which may
be the answer. 19 The SSA would permit retroactive application of
the FSA, expand the existing “safety valve” 20 exception, and allow
for increased individualized review by reducing mandatory
minimums for certain drug offenses. 21
This comment discusses the SSA, explores the need for a
financially responsible sentencing reformation, and ultimately
argues that Congress should pass the SSA. Part II explains how
federal courts determine sentences based on the current Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) and how mandatory minimums affect the sentencing
process. 22 Part III analyzes the SSA’s proposed amendments, how
these changes would complement the FSA, and why the SSA is both
an economical and practical approach to sentencing. Finally, Part
IV proposes that Congress pass the SSA to align sentencing
practices with sentencing goals. 23
While this comment discusses the Smarter Sentencing Act of
2013, the SSA has undergone a few minor, but noteworthy changes.
First, the text of the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013 was slightly
amended on March 11, 2014 and the bill became known as the
“Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014.” 24 Then, the most devastating
change occurred when the new version of the bill did not pass in the
47% of the prison population incarcerated for drug offenses).
16. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, Table 43 [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/annual-reports-sourcebooks/
2012/sourcebook-2012 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
17. Pierce Williams, Democrats and Republicans Agree: Reform Our Racist,
Wasteful Drug Laws, POLICYMIC (Aug. 2013), http://www.policymic.com/
articles/58547/democrats-and-republicans-agree-reform-our-racist-wastefuldrug-laws.
18. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, S. 1410, 113th Cong. (2013).
19. S. 1410 (113th), GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/
s1410 (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2010).
21. Press Release, Durbin and Lee Introduce Smarter Sentencing Act (Aug.
1, 2013), available at http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press
releases?ID=be68ad86-a0a4-4486-853f-f8ef7b99e736.
22. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). The Supreme Court
was faced with the constitutional conflict that arises when a defendant receives
an enhanced sentence (above the guideline range) based on additional findings
by the judge while another defendant receives a lower sentence that falls within
the guidelines, based on the jury’s verdict. Id. at 227–29.
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2012).
24. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, S. 1410, 113th Cong. (2013), available
at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1410/text (last visited Apr. 6,
2015).
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113th Congress. 25 However, that was not the end of the Smarter
Sentencing Act. On February 12, 2015, the Smarter Sentencing Act
of 2015 26 was introduced in the 114th Congress. 27 The new version
of the bill is substantially similar to the Smarter Sentencing Act of
2014 and shares the same general goal – modernizing federal drug
sentencing policies with respect to certain non-violent drug
offenses. 28 Like the previous bill, the Smarter Sentencing Act of
2015 has received tremendous bipartisan support, but will face the
same uphill battle in its journey to become a law. 29

II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Federal Sentencing Process
The United States Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”)
was created through the The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 30 The
Commission is made up of seven members who are appointed by the
President to serve six-year terms. 31 As an independent agency of the
Judicial Branch, the Commission was established to assist
Congress in creating federal sentencing policies. 32 Most notably, the
25. S. 1410 (113th): Smarter Sentencing Act of 2014, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1410 (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
The bill was first introduced on July 31, 2013, reported by Senate Committee
on January 30, 2014, and amendments were made to the text on March 11, 2014.
Id. The updated version was not enacted. Id.
26. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, S. 502, 114th Cong. (2015), available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s502/text; Smarter Sentencing Act
of 2015, H.R. 920, 114th Cong. (2015), available at https://www.govtrack.
us/congress/bills/114/hr920/text.
27. Press Release, Lee, Durbin Introduce Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015,
(Feb.
12,
2015),
available
at
http://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/2/lee-durbin-introducesmarter-sentencing-act-of-2015.
28. U.S. House and Senate Reintroduce an *Even Smarter* Smarter
Sentencing Act, FAMM (Feb. 12, 2015), http://famm.org/u-s-house-and-senatereintroduce-an-even-smarter-smarter-sentencing-act/.
29. S. 502: Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s502 (last visited Apr. 6, 2015)
(projecting an eight percent chance of being enacted by the Senate); H.R. 920:
Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/114/hr920 (last visited Apr. 6, 2015 (projecting a two percent chance of
being enacted by the House of Representatives).
30. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §211–39, 98 Stat. 1987, 1987–2040 (codified as 28
U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2000)).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2008). The Sentencing Reform Act requires at least
three members of the Sentencing Commission to be federal judges and no more
than four members can belong to the same political party. Id.; U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/
overview/USSC_Overview.pdf.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2000). The Sentencing Commission established a
permanent committee to develop the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. However, the
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Commission developed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“the
Guidelines”), which became effective in 1987. 33 The purpose of the
Guidelines was to reduce sentence disparities, add structure to
crime control, limit judicial discretion, and target specific offenders
with more serious penalties. 34
The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual contains a
sentencing table, which is used to arrive at the appropriate
sentencing range based on the present offense and the defendant’s
criminal history. 35 The offense level is determined by adjusting the
defendant’s base offense level 36 up or down depending on whether
she played a large role in the offense, whether there were victims,
whether she accepted responsibility, and whether she obstructed
justice. 37 The criminal history category (CHC) is reached by adding
up the defendant’s criminal history points, which are accumulated
for any past criminal conduct. 38 The sentencing table then suggests
a range of months based on the intersection of the particular offense
level and CHC. 39 Before the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in
United States v. Booker, 40 sentencing within the range was
mandatory and judges could only depart from the guideline range
Sentencing Commission serves a variety of other functions, such as: (1) assisting
Congress in the development of crime policy; (2) researching and analyzing
various trends and sentencing issues; and (3) maintaining congressional goals
concerning federal crime. Id.
33. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012). Despite the common perception that the
Guidelines were mandatory, this statutory provision slightly expanded judicial
discretion in some limited circumstances where judges found an aggravating or
mitigating factor that was not considered by the Guidelines. Id.
35. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5, Part A. The
Sentencing Table provides a grid of sentencing ranges expressed in months,
with the exception of the recommendation of life imprisonment for some ranges,
which make up the sentencing table. Id. The sentencing table grid is divided
into four “zones” (Zone A through Zone D). Id. Zone A offenses allow for
probation, with a range between 0 to 6 months. U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(a)(1), §
5C1.1(b). Zone B and C offenses allow a “split” (some form of confinement
followed by either probation or supervised release). U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(a)(2), §§
5C1.1(c), (d). Zone D recommends imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1(f).
36. U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.1–2X7.2. Chapter 2 of the Sentencing Manual lists each
offense and provides a corresponding base offense level. Id.
37. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The guidelines are often determined based on relevant
conduct, resulting in punishment for conduct beyond that which the defendant
may have been charged or convicted. Id.
38. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. Criminal history, which makes up the horizontal axis
of the sentencing table is divided into six categories, from I (lowest) to VI
(highest). Id. Points are assigned based on the defendant’s prior sentences and
juvenile adjudications. Id. These points (if any), which are mostly based on
length of sentence, are then added to the points assigned for the instant offense
to determine the total. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. An upward or downward departure is
authorized when a defendant’s CHC does not adequately reflect the seriousness
of past conduct or likelihood of recidivism. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(A)(4)(B), (b)(2).
Such departures are still subject to some limitations. Id.
39. U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.1–5H1.6.
40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 220.
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in “exceptional cases.” 41

B. Booker Shifts the Focus to the Statutory Sentencing
Factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
The Supreme Court’s decision in Booker was a major defining
point for the Guidelines. 42 In Booker, the Court held that mandatory
sentencing under the Guidelines violates the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial. 43 Accordingly, the Court was forced to decide
how to treat the Guidelines. 44 Rather than completely eliminate the
Guidelines, the Court determined that judges must consult them
but are not required to apply them. 45 By rendering the Guidelines
merely advisory, Booker returned some discretion to sentencing
judges by giving them the ability to depart from the guideline range.
In particular, judges are now required to consider the factors
in and goals behind § 3553(a), not just the Guidelines. 46 By
analyzing these factors, courts can determine whether a departure
from the Guidelines is appropriate. 47 The statutory factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed
to promote punishment, deterrence, and public protection; (3) the
kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the
sentencing range established for . . . the applicable category of offense
committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the
guidelines . . . ;(5) any pertinent policy statement; (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities; and (7) the need to provide
41. Id. at 221.
42. Id. at 226. The Court excised § 3553(b)(1), rendering the guidelines
advisory to avoid the need for jury findings in sentencing hearings. Id. at 226,
245.
43. Id. at 267. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi, that “[a]ny fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence
exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty
or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 244. Thus, Booker’s sentence was unconstitutional
because it was enhanced based on the judge’s findings beyond the maximum
allowed under the jury’s verdict. Id. at 267.
44. Id. at 243–44.
45. Id. at 259–60.
46. Id.
47. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 2 Pt. H, Ch. 2 Pt. K (outlining policies the Commission
recognizes as factors that might warrant a departure from the guideline range).
Pre-Booker, these sections limiting courts’ authority and departures were only
available in limited circumstances. §§ 5K2.0(a)(1), (b)(2). Today, courts rely on
§ 3553(a) factors when sentencing outside the guideline range, rather than
Chapter 5 of the Guidelines. See also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2011
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, TABLE N, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_
and_Sourcebooks/2011/sbtoc12.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (finding that
courts departed below guidelines in 2,893 cases and sentenced below the range
for other reasons in 11,869 cases).
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restitution to any victims of the offense. 48

The language of § 3553(a) also provides that the sentence
imposed shall be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to
achieve the goals of sentencing. 49 These goals include:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 50

The significance of these factors and goals is that post-Booker
sentencing courts must now consider the personal characteristics of
the defendant in determining whether a departure from the
guideline range is necessary. 51 Since the guideline range serves only
as a starting point, it is always subject to an upward or downward
departure based on the existence of any mitigating or aggravating
factors. 52 Such variances can come in the form of a departure within
the Guidelines framework or an application of § 3553(a) factors. 53
However, many post-Booker decisions indicate that judges still
give significant weight to the guideline range and are reluctant to
depart, despite its advisory nature. 54 An even more problematic
scenario arises when a statutory sentencing minimum interferes
with the judge’s discretion to impose a sentence outside the
guideline range. 55 The conflict results in a complete deprivation of
all judicial discretion to impose a sentence below the statutory
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). See also United States v. Cunningham, 429
F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that a court should look beyond the
guidelines to determine a sentence and analyze the § 3553(a) factors as they
apply to the particular case). The statutory factors are intended to be the
starting point for sentence determinations. Id. However, that is not usually the
case since they do not provide a numeric range to consider for sentencing in
terms of months. Id.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012).
51. Id. Before Booker, characteristics of the defendant were only applied to
the guideline range in “exceptional cases.” U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.1–5H1.6. Such
characteristics are also enumerated in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2).
52. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109 (recognizing that the Guidelines provide
a sentencing range, which acts as a benchmark, subject to the application of
upward or downward departures as they are warranted, based on judicial
findings unique to the individual case).
53. Id.
54. Id. On appeal, a sentence within the Guidelines range may be given a
presumption of reasonableness and will be reviewed using the abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 354–55 (2007).
55. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002). See also Edwards v.
United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998) (holding that the constitutional rule of
Apprendi does not apply to mandatory minimum sentences).
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minimum, even if the Guidelines or § 3553(a) factors warrant a
shorter sentence. 56

C. The Conflict among Mandatory Minimums, the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, and the §
3553(a) Factors
Under a federal sentencing system focused on individualized
sentences, mandatory minimums seem entirely out of place because
they fail to account for the specific offense, the particular defendant,
and judicial discretion. 57 By superseding the sentencing process,
mandatory minimums create vast sentence disparities, which is
precisely what the Sentencing Commission set out to eradicate. 58
Federal judges are forced to apply a “one size fits all” sentence,
unless one of the limited exceptions applies. 59 The most shocking
disparities often result from statutory mandatory minimums for
federal drug offenses – more specifically, sentences under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1), (2) and 21 U.S.C. §§ 960(b)(1), (2). 60

D. Post-Booker Legislation Aimed at Remedying
Unintended Sentencing Disparities
In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) in an
effort to close the gap in crack-cocaine sentencing disparities. The
FSA made several significant changes to the United States Code
and the Sentencing Guidelines, even eliminating certain sentences.
Among other important goals, such as altering the application of
mandatory minimums, the main purpose of the FSA was “to restore

56. See 2010 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION § 5G1.1 (Nov. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_HTML/5g1_1.htm
(explaining that the statutory limit controls when there is a conflict between
mandatory minimums or maximums and the guidelines, or § 3553(a) factors).
57. See Molly M. Gill, Let’s Abolish Mandatory Minimums the Punishment
Must Fit the Crime, HUM. RTS., Spring 2009, at 4 (explaining mandatory
minimums, which are essentially “one-size-fits-all,” violate human rights).
58. Id.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012). The “safety valve” allows federal judges to
sentence certain non-violent drug offenders below the statutory mandatory
minimums, but only if the offenders meet the limited criteria. Id.
60. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 960(b) (providing mandatory minimum
sentences of five and ten years). See also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (showing that the
offense level in drug and drug conspiracy cases is generally determined by drug
type and quantity, according to the table, which includes a very wide range of
offense levels); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1 (explaining how mandatory minimums affect
the guideline ranges in the sentencing table). If the entire range is below the
statutory minimum, the minimum becomes the guideline sentence. U.S.S.G. §
5G1.1(b); Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, § 2.
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the fairness to federal cocaine sentencing.” 61 However, because the
FSA does not apply retroactively, disparities persist among those
sentenced before the statute’s effective date. 62 Drug-related
sentences are unfair and counterproductive when they do not
achieve the underlying goals and purposes of sentencing. 63
In response to the lingering disparities, The Smarter
Sentencing Act of 2013 (SSA) was introduced with the intention of
restructuring and modernizing the current federal drug sentencing
policies. 64 The SSA seeks to return a certain degree of sentencing
discretion to judges when dealing with certain non-violent drug
offenders. In doing so, the SSA promotes sentencing procedures that
are not only fair, but also shaped by the financial burdens
associated with mandatory minimums. The problems with
mandatory minimums will not fix themselves and the pressure is
mounting for lawmakers to find a solution before more harm is
done.
III. ANALYSIS
The SSA was first introduced in Congress on August 1, 2013. 65
Although it is not a law, the proposed legislation has been well
received among both Democrats and Republicans who support the
movement towards achieving fair and financially responsible
sentencing policies. 66 Even in its current form, the SSA highlights
the negative effects of mandatory minimums and reflects a
challenge to the basic premise of using such minimums. 67 At the
very least, the SSA has brought attention to an important issue that
61. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, § 2. Section 2 of the FSA reduces the
disparities between crack and powder cocaine sentencing by increasing the
quantities necessary to trigger the mandatory minimums. Id. This provision
reduced the 100:1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine sentences to 18:1. Id.
Section 3 of the FSA eliminated the mandatory minimum for simple possession
by striking the statutory provision. Id. § 3.
62. The FSA applies to offenders that meet its criteria, with offenses under
the applicable statutes, and that were sentenced, or committed their offense
after the FSA’s effective date of August 3, 2010. Id. § 2.
63. Gill, supra note 57, at 4–5.
64. The SSA would affect the mandatory minimum drug sentences under 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (B) and 21 U.S.C. §§ 960(b)(1), (2). S. 1410, § 4. The
current ten and twenty year minimums would be reduced to five and ten years,
respectively. Id. The five and ten year minimums would be reduced to two and
five years, respectively. Id. The SSA does not repeal any mandatory minimums
or lower any maximum sentences for the applicable offenses. Id. § 2.
65. S. 1410 (113th), supra note 19.
66. Id.
67. See Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Nicole Austin-Hillery & Jessica Eaglin, Re:
Support for Bipartisan “Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013” Introduced by Senators
Durbin and Lee, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1 (July 31, 2013),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/073113_Comments_S
marter_Sentencing_Act.pdf (providing a press release to show support for the
SSA and spread awareness about the current problems with federal prison
populations that are caused by mandatory minimum sentences).
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Democrats and Republicans agree needs to be addressed. 68

A. If Passed, the SSA Requires the Sentencing
Commission and the Attorney General to Take
Immediate Action
1. The SSA’s Directive to the U.S. Sentencing Commission
If the SSA becomes law, the Sentencing Commission will
experience the most immediate effects of its amendments. 69 To
maintain a uniform and cohesive sentencing system, the SSA would
require the Sentencing Commission to amend the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to reflect the changes. 70 Specifically, the
Sentencing Commission would have to adjust the mandatory
minimums and incorporate the SSA’s goals for reducing federal
prison capacities in its own efforts to improve the sentencing
system. 71 The SSA’s goals would also be incorporated into the
Commission’s efforts to fulfill Congress’ intent of finding ways to
achieve a fair and efficient sentencing system. 72
2. The Attorney General’s Report
Additionally, if the SSA became law, the Attorney General
would be required to prepare a report for Congress about how
sentencing practices impact the allocation of financial resources. 73
68. There has been broad, bipartisan support for the SSA. Press Release,
Durbin and Lee Introduce Smarter Sentencing Act, supra note 21 (providing a
list of supporters of the SSA). Supporting organizations include the National
Association of Evangelicals to the United Methodist Church, Heritage Action,
Justice Fellowship of Prison Fellowship Ministries, the ACLU, Grover Norquist,
the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, the
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, the NAACP, the Sentencing
Project, Open Society Policy Center, the American Bar Association, NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, the Constitution
Project, Drug Policy Alliance, Brennan Center for Justice, and Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Id.
69. S. 1410, § 5. Section five of the SSA, “Directive to the Sentencing
Commission,” directs the Commission to review and amend its guidelines and
policy statements to ensure consistency with the SSA’s amendments and
accurately reflect Congress’ intent. Id. The Commission must also consider the
SSA’s goals and formulate the guidelines in a way that reduces the likelihood
that federal prison populations will continue to exceed capacity. Id.
70. Id. The Commission must ensure the guidelines remain consistent with
the goals of all new sentencing laws. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 6. See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 31 (explaining
that the principle purposes of the Sentencing Commission include researching,
gathering, and analyzing data for advising and assisting Congress in developing
effective and efficient crime policy).
73. S. 1410, § 6. The Attorney General must provide Congress with a report
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The Attorney General’s report must provide specific details on cost
savings and how the excess money generated by the SSA will be
invested in law enforcement and used to fund programs for
increasing crime prevention and reducing recidivism. 74 These
reports are crucial for Congressional review and monitoring of the
effects of the SSA.

B. The SSA Would Return Necessary Discretion to
Judges for Imposing Sentences in Accordance With
the Statutory Factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
The Supreme Court’s decision in Booker gave a great deal of
discretion back to federal judges by allowing a judge to stray from
the Guidelines when determining sentences. However, many postBooker decisions involving non-violent drug offenders show that
this discretion is often obstructed by the application of statutory
mandatory minimums. 75 Generally, mandatory minimums impede
any efforts of federal judges to impose sentences in accordance with
the § 3553(a) factors when they fall below the mandatory
minimum. 76 The negative effects of this can be seen in federal
prisons throughout the country, where many non-violent drug
offenders are currently serving excessive sentences based entirely
on the mandatory minimum. 77
The SSA proposes a slight reduction in the severity and scope
of certain mandatory minimums, which would give judges more
liberty to exercise their discretion in reaching an appropriate
sentence based on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the § 3553(a)
factors. 78 Federal judges would be able to conduct more
individualized reviews and not be forced to impose a sentence that
outlining how the SSA’s cost savings will be used towards more effective Federal
criminal justice spending within six months of the date the SSA is enacted. Id.
74. Id.
75. The Supreme Court has decided twelve cases directly involving federal
sentencing under the advisory Guidelines since Booker: Dorsey v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2321, 2321 (2012); Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2685
(2011); Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1229 (2011); Tapia v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2382 (2011); Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683,
2683 (2010); Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 350 (2009); Spears v. United
States, 555 U.S. 261, 261 (2009); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 708
(2008); Moore v. United States, 555 U.S. 1, 1 (2008); Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 38 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 85 (2007); Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 338 (2007).
76. Id.
77. See 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 16, at Table 43 (showing the amount
of offenders subjected to mandatory minimums that sometimes impose
excessive sentences based on the characteristics of the offender). Each year,
roughly sixty percent of all federal drug offenders are subject to mandatory
minimums. Id. In 2012, over half of all convicted federal drug offenders had
little or no criminal record. Id. at Table 37.
78. S. 1410, § 4.
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does not reflect the characteristics of the defendant and seriousness
of the offense.
It is important to note that the SSA lowers, but does not repeal,
any mandatory minimums. Despite this, the SSA’s proposed
amendments still give judges more discretion to decide whether
particularly harsh sentences should apply, depending on the
individual offender. 79 Specifically, the SSA would only come into
play for offenders charged with the various drug offenses covered by
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B), and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1), (2). 80
Increased discretion is a sensitive component of the SSA
because it gives more power to judges to exercise their subjective
beliefs with regard to an appropriate sentence. 81 Of course, it is
possible that this could lead to sentencing disparities among
seemingly similar offenders sentenced by different judges. 82
However, the SSA attempts to address these concerns by imposing
very modest changes to the sentencing process and ensuring certain
safeguards remain in place. Moreover, the current sentencing
authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3552 would not be affected in any way. 83
Judges will still be directed to consult the Sentencing Guidelines as
a starting point and to impose a sentence in accordance with the §
3553(a) factors. 84
The SSA would also have an effect on the “safety valve”
provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 because judges would be required to
consider a larger group of non-violent drug offenders that may
qualify under the slightly broader criteria. 85 However, the SSA does
not explicitly address whether the amendments to certain
mandatory minimums or whether the expansion of the existing
safety valve will apply retroactively. The SSA’s silence with regard
to these matters indicates that it would likely only apply to
offenders sentenced after the date it becomes law.

79. Id. §§ 2–4.
80. Id. § 4. The SSA will not apply to violent offenders. Id. However, it will
still have a drastic affect because roughly eighty-five percent of all federal drug
offenders did not have a weapon involved in the offense. 2012 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 16, at Table 39.
81. Keith Humphreys, The Many Foes of Discretion in Criminal Cases, THE
REALITY-BASED COMMUNITY (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.samefacts.com/2013/
08/drug-policy/the-many-foes-of-discretion-in-criminal-cases/.
82. Id.
83. Press Release: Durbin and Lee Introduce Smarter Sentencing Act, supra
note 21.
84. Id.
85. Id. The statutory factors under § 3553(a) will not be affected by the SSA’s
amendments and will continue to be the main source of sentencing authority for
federal judges.

922

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:909

C. The SSA Would Help Restore Fairness and Justice
to Qualifying Non-Violent Federal Drug Offenders
Currently Serving Prison Sentences Unrelated to the
Magnitude of the Crime
In 2010, the bipartisan Fair Sentencing Act was passed in
response to the continuing problems with sentencing disparities.
The FSA sought to close the gap between sentence disparities for
crack and cocaine offenses. In doing so, it shed light on the need for
broader reforms of the non-violent drug offender sentencing regime.
The SSA explicitly states that it would effectuate retroactive
application of the FSA in an effort to fully achieve the FSA’s goals. 86
For this reason, the SSA will likely have more of an effect on the
minority groups that the FSA could not reach because such
offenders were sentenced before the FSA’s effective date. 87 This
includes those offenders disproportionately affected by the crack
and powder cocaine sentencing disparities who did not qualify for
the benefits of the FSA solely based on timing reasons. 88
Since the past and current sentencing policies have the
greatest impact on racial minorities, it follows that the benefits of
the SSA will appear to favor those minority groups. 89 However, the
SSA will not apply to offenders who already received the FSA’s
benefits and those individuals will not be allowed to petition for
sentence reductions. 90 The SSA would only apply to certain nonviolent federal drug offenders and would not affect those charged
with crimes at the state level. 91
86. S. 1410, § 3. Upon motion, courts may impose a sentence in accordance
with the SSA’s amendments as if sections two and three of the FSA were in
effect at the time the defendant was sentenced. Id..
87. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:
AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 113 (2004), available at
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/library/2013/02/26/Henderson_15Year.pdf. The Commission’s report criticizes mandatory minimum
penalties for creating unwarranted uniformity, unwarranted disparity, and
undue severity, and for bypassing collaboration with essential participants and
criminological research as sources of sentencing policy development. Id.
However, the report essentially acknowledges that the Commission took a bad
idea and made it worse. Id. at 13.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Application of the SSA will be limited to defendants that have not
already received sentence reductions in accordance with the FSA. S. 1410, § 3.
91. Id. § 2–4. Non-violent offenders will receive the benefits of the SSA with
regard to its mandatory minimum reductions and the expansion of the existing
federal safety valve. Id. The SSA’s modest safety valve expansion will only
extend to include those offenders with a criminal history category of two or less.
Id. at § 2. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (requiring the defendant to have no
more than one criminal history point in order for the safety valve to apply). In
addition, just because certain pre-FSA offenders may now qualify for benefits of
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D. The SSA Would Benefit Every Taxpayer and Citizen
1. The SSA Will Generate More Money for Improving Crime
Prevention and Managing Drug Problems in
Communities Throughout the Country
If the SSA becomes law, it would have a much broader effect
than just changing the way judges determine sentences for those
qualifying defendants. 92 Because the SSA would reduce the amount
of time certain non-violent drug offenders spend in prison, the
government would no longer be forced to allocate as many of its
financial resources towards funding Department of Correction’s
expenses. 93 Since it would cost much less to run federal prisons with
fewer inmates, the excess government funds can be used in ways
that benefit the general public as a whole. 94
The SSA aims to reallocate resources so that government funds
will be put towards incarcerating only the most serious offenders. 95
Rather than spending taxpayer money on prison costs to house
inmates serving excessive sentences, these funds would be put
towards improving crime prevention outside the prison systems. 96
Thus, resources will be available for a more proactive approach and
communities can find ways to manage the drug problem at the front
end in order to keep people out of prison.
2. Federal Prisons Will Be Safer and Unburdened by
Overcrowded Prison Populations
Not only would the SSA help alleviate the financial pressures
on the government to fund the prison systems, it would also help
alleviate the severe structural strains caused by prison

the SSA, it does not mean the SSA will automatically apply. The limited
category of offenders must first petition for a sentence reduction and it is within
the discretion of the judge to determine whether it will be granted. S. 1410, § 3.
Federal judges still have the discretion to deny the request if they determine
the person does not meet the criteria. Id. In addition, the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the court can file a motion for a
sentence reduction under the SSA. Id. at § 3(b).
92. See Press Release: Durbin and Lee Introduce Smarter Sentencing Act,
supra note 21 (explaining how the SSA seeks to improve crime prevention and
public safety with the funds generated by lower sentences).
93. Id.
94. Senators Dick Durbin and Mike Lee describe mandatory minimums as
“financially wasteful and irresponsible”, and expect the SSA’s amendments
could save taxpayers billions of dollars just in the first year of its enactment. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Sections five and six of the SSA also further this purpose through the
directives to the Sentencing Commission and Attorney General. S. 1410, §§ 5,
6.
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overcrowding. 97 When prisons exceed maximum capacity, there is
no way to effectively maintain the overwhelming population of
inmates and prison infrastructures are put in jeopardy. 98
If passed, the SSA would help create a safer work environment
for federal prison personnel and guards and reduce the threat of
safety risks to the inmates. 99 The SSA also addresses threats to
public safety that exist beyond the prison doors. 100 A sense of
distrust for the criminal justice system is often felt among
communities that either experience first-hand or become aware of
the harsh results of mandatory minimums. 101 It creates an
incredibly hostile environment not only in the federal prisons but
also throughout the community when offenders receive sentences
that are not proportionate to their crime. 102
3. The SSA Will Not Have an Adverse Economic Effect on
the Prison Industry
Many critics are reluctant to accept legislation that seeks to
reduce prison sentences because they fear it will negatively impact
the prison industry and eliminate jobs. 103 The resistance is
97. See Press Release: Durbin and Lee Introduce Smarter Sentencing Act,
supra note 21 (stating that the United States has experienced a 500 percent
increase in the number of federal inmates over the past thirty years). Currently,
the Bureau of Prisons is about forty percent overcapacity and more than fifty
percent over capacity in high-security facilities. Id.
98. See John Irwin, Vincent Schiraldi and Jason Ziedenberg, Justice Policy
Inst., America’s One Million Non-Violent Prisoners 5 (Mar. 1999), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/993_REP_OneMillionNonviolentPrisoners_AC.pdf (explaining that the 1,185,458
nonviolent offenders we currently lock up represents five times the number of
people held in India’s entire prison system, even though it is a country with
roughly four times our population). In addition, the European Union’s prison
population is only roughly 300,000, which is one third the number of prisoners
the United States incarcerates even though the country’s population consists of
roughly one million fewer people. Id.
99. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE EXPANDING FEDERAL PRISON
POPULATION 1 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/inc_FederalPrisonFactsheet_March2012.pdf. See also THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS 1 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/sl_fedprisonpopulation.pdf (finding approximately three-fourths of
the federal prison population are serving time for non-violent offenses and have
no history of violence).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See John Fuquay, Expanding Prison Mean More Jobs, FAYETTEVILLE
OBSERVER (July 20, 2008), http://www.fayobserver.com/news/local/expandingprisons-mean-more-jobs/article_fd48e438-47f3-526e-a268-7163e594cf64.html
(highlighting how some economic incentives support mass incarceration trends
that promote the expansion of the prison industry). For some communities,
prisons lead to new jobs and stimulate the local economy, which makes them a
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primarily from those who rely on prisons as the primary source of
employment in their community. 104 However, the desire for
continued job creation in a thriving prison industry should not bear
any weight on the need to modernize sentencing policies so that
offenders are only in prison for as long as their characteristics and
offense require. 105

IV. PROPOSAL
Congress never intended the federal sentencing process to be
set in stone as a perfect and complete system, immune from
modifications and improvements. 106 The evolution and development
of the sentencing system has proven to be a challenging process that
requires patience and adaptability. 107 The system must change with
the times, accommodate competing interests, and address
unintended negative consequences. Unfortunately, the process has
turned out to be one of “trial and error.” The need for change only
comes to light through unfair sentencing trends and developments
that are observed and analyzed over time. But, there is a solution,
and although it might not always be a quick fix, Congress has the
power to pass new legislation that takes small steps towards
remedying the negative effects of the current sentencing
regulations.
This section will discuss the reasons why the SSA deserves
Congress’ immediate attention and why it should be passed into
law. It will argue that the amendments proposed by the legislation
are necessary to move forward and combat the reoccurring dilemma
positive and desirable addition to the community. Id. Rather than fearing that
prisons in the community will put the citizens’ safety in jeopardy with the risk
of escaped inmates, “[m]ost people are excited about the jobs.” Id. The increase
in jobs is so desirable that a county in rural North Carolina even went as far as
to scrap plans for a landfill in favor of a prison instead. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. As just one example, through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to ensure the purposes of §
3553(a)(2) were met, that the Guidelines were effectively promoting and
achieving those purposes, and that they reflected the advancement in
knowledge of human behavior. This was largely based on Congress’ efforts to
minimize the likelihood of prison overcrowding, and avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities and the intent that the sentencing policies afforded
sufficient discretion to judges to impose individualized sentences when
necessary to achieve those goals. Also, it should be noted that prison
overcrowding was a concern as early as 1984, and is not something that just
came to light in recent years.
107. The Commission was not directed with precise directions on how to
achieve Congress’ directive. Congress merely conveys the underlying objectives
and it is the Commission’s responsibility to find and implement a solution based
on the analysis and findings. Congress did not require an immediate solution
that wiped away the problem, it just recognized the needs and what it sought to
avoid, with the understanding that this will be a continual process.
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that arises when a judge is bound by mandatory minimums that
force the imposition of a sentence beyond what they believe is
necessary or deserving. It will analyze the ways in which restoring
discretion to judges and reducing certain statutory mandatory
minimums for non-violent drug offenders can have an overall
positive effect on the prison system and redirect resources to the
community for crime prevention efforts. In addition, it will focus on
the many financial benefits the SSA would offer and the need for a
modern sentencing policy that is more financially responsible.
Finally, it will conclude that it is imperative for Congress to pass
the SSA to solve this problem.
Federal courts cannot continue to function under a system
where statutory mandatory minimums force judges to impose
unfair and excessive sentences. 108 The SSA specifically targets these
mandatory minimums and the narrow “safety valve” exception that
exists under the current statute. It does this in recognition of the
fact that citizens of every state are surrounded by the negative
consequences of mandatory minimums, which are the driving force
behind skyrocketing prison populations. 109
With a struggling economy and a steadily rising national debt,
the imperative for Congress to bring fiscal sanity to sentencing
policies has never been greater. Federal prisons are filled beyond
capacity with many offenders whose release date is nowhere in
sight. New arrests and convictions will continue to accumulate,
regardless of whether prisons have the space for them. Under the
current system, prisons will consume enormous sums of the
government’s scarce financial resources every year because it has
no choice but to continue to fund prisons. In light of the national
debt that continues to steadily rise, the government needs to more
closely scrutinize the allocation of its limited resources to ensure
each taxpayer dollar is being spent wisely. Every citizen bears the
cost of over-incarceration and rapidly expanding prison
populations. 110
108. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 47–48 (Nov. 2004),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_
study_full.pdf. According to the report, sentence lengths for drug offenses have
been the major cause of federal prison population growth and racial disparities
in sentencing. Id. at 76. See also U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to
Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice
System (Aug. 1991) [hereinafter Special Report to Congress], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatoryminimum-penalties/special-report-congress (blaming mandatory minimums for
disproportionate severity in sentencing, a lack of uniformity, and increased
disparities).
109. Special Report to Congress, supra note 108.
110. See also DEP’T OF JUSTICE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM OPERATING COST
PER INMATE 118-19, available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975_
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It is undisputed that the cost of housing federal inmates will
continue to grow and that the number of federal inmates will likely
grow as well. 111 When that happens, there will be no choice about
how much money to allocate to the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
cover facility expenses, and the DOJ will be forced to pay whatever
it costs to run the prisons. 112 Keeping offenders in prison longer than
necessary to achieve the purposes of punishment is a waste of
money and the government simply does not have excess resources
to spare. 113 The result is wasteful and unfair to inmates, prison
officials, and every taxpayer whose tax dollars are not being put
back into their community, or towards efforts to reduce crime and
recidivism. 114
The SSA places several pressing and controversial sentencing
practices in the spotlight. The SSA has a bold approach towards
achieving economically conscious sentencing practices and
straightforward goals, which have caught the attention of many
lawmakers and sentencing advocates. Unfortunately, this attention
is not enough. Congress needs to pass the SSA and not wait any
longer to implement fair sentencing policies that consider the
country’s economic needs as well. The financial repercussions
2002/2002/html/page117-119.htm (charting data representing various trends in
federal prison system salaries and expenses from 1975 through 2003 as well as
costs attributable to inmates).
111. Matthew G. Rowland, Too Many Going Back, Not Enough Getting Out?
Supervision Violators, Probation Supervision, and Overcrowding in the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 77 FEDERAL PROBATION 3–16 (Sept. 2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2013-09/toomany.html#overcrowding. The growth rate in federal prisons is largely due to
the legislative history, and the current legislature will only continue to add to
the problem. Id.
112. Id. More people are being convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison
sentences, and less people are getting out on parole or supervised release. Id.
The result is concerning for prison infrastructure and the future of prisons,
which are not built to house so many offenders. Id.
113. See Costs of Imprisonment Far Exceed Supervision Costs, UNITED
STATES COURTS (May 12, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/0905-12/Costs_of_Imprisonment_Far_Exceed_Supervision_Costs.aspx (suggesting that the financial costs associated with general deterrence do not justify the
punishment once it becomes ineffective). It is wasteful to continue to pay to keep
an inmate in prison when the deterrent effect of incapacitation is no longer
serving its purpose. Id.
114. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL
HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 13–16 (May
2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ files/pdf/research-andpublications/researchpublications/2004/200405_Recidivism_Criminal_
History.pdf. See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, A COMPARISON OF THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY AND THE
U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION SALIENT FACTOR SCORE 15–17 (Jan. 4, 2005),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2005/20050104_Recidivism_Salient_Factor_Comp
utation.pdf (suggesting that being a drug offender is one of several factors that
predict a reduced risk of recidivism).
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associated with excessive sentences cannot be ignored and Congress
needs to recognize that this outweighs the resistance against
legislation that appears to promote shorter prison sentences.
The overly harsh and outdated policies that currently shape
sentencing determinations promote excessive and unnecessary
incarceration in certain situations and do not consider the financial
repercussions whatsoever. There is no problem with conceding that
certain mandatory minimums are too strict or that, in some limited
situations, the “tough on crime” mentality does not serve a
legitimate purpose. The federal sentencing process might never
obtain a perfect result, but, through the SSA, underlying issues can
be addressed and managed in an effective manner.
The harm caused by unfair, senseless, and uneconomical
sentencing policies is not speculative. 115 The SSA recognizes what is
already occurring in the federal prison system, traces it to the
source, and offers a practical solution to the problem. The SSA is
imperative for changing unfair sentence policies at the front end,
with sentence imposition, which can only happen if discretion is
returned to judges by relaxing mandatory minimums that do not
serve a valid sentencing purpose or public interest. 116

V.

CONCLUSION

Congress must reduce the financial strain that is currently
being placed on taxpayers by wasteful sentencing practices. The
SSA is the necessary means for significantly reducing the cost of
federal prisons. By returning discretion to judges, reducing certain
mandatory minimums, and expanding the existing safety valve, the
prison populations will stop expanding at such unmanageable rates.
These minor adjustments will generate overwhelming cost-savings
and alleviate the financial and structural strains that are so heavily
burdening federal prisons.
The SSA should not be confused with being “soft on crime.” The
SSA is carefully crafted with significant attention to the continued
need to impose punishments that reflects the magnitude and
seriousness of the crime. Reducing prison sentences does not mean
federal courts are being more lenient on punishment. It simply
means judges are being afforded the discretion to consider the
115. See Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal
Sentence Severity: 1980–1998, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 12 (July–Aug. 1999),
available at 1999 WL 1458615 (reporting that prisoners with minimal risk of
recidivism were serving long prison sentences despite the lack of need for
deterrence). Over ten years ago the Commission shared its findings that the
average time served has dramatically increased, without proper justification for
it, yet nothing was done to fix the problem. Id.
116. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and
the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV.
571, 590 (2005).
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individual offender and arrive at an appropriate sentence based on
the § 3553(a) factors and the Sentencing Guidelines, as opposed to
an overly harsh “one size fits all” mandatory minimum sentence.
Congress must realize how important the SSA is for remedying the
devastating effects of mandatory minimums, and should act swiftly
to make this bill a law.
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